



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Hurdles Delay Schuman Plan

by Howard C. Gary

French statesmen who have been plodding ahead grimly in an attempt to get the Schuman plan underway are beginning to wonder whether a federated Europe is not a prerequisite or at least a co-requisite to the success of the coal-steel pool plan.

The view was widely held that if the Schuman accord could be shifted into high gear, the chronic tensions that beset Franco-German relations might be eased to the mutual advantage of not only these two pivotal nations but the whole of Western Europe as well. Despite ratification by the six participating countries, several formidable hurdles must be cleared before the Schuman plan becomes a living reality.

It would be overstating the case to say that the French Assembly regrets having ratified the pool pact. But there is no doubt that Paris has many fears about the operation of the coal-steel community.

France is perturbed by German reluctance to dissolve the cartel-like West German Coal Sales Agency. This coal-selling combine violates the decartelization principle of the Schuman accord. And, more important, its operations give a real price advantage to German

steel producers competing with the French.

Paris asked the government of the German Federal Republic to postpone a contemplated expansion of steel capacity until the Schuman plan reaches the operative stage. The Quai d'Orsay argued that coordination of investment decisions was a key element in the pool plan. French officials said the unilateral expansion of the German steel industry would contravene the treaty. Germany flatly refused the French request. When Paris turned to the other members of the Schuman plan, it found little support. The participating countries besides France and Western Germany are Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands.

French officials are particularly concerned about the role of the Saar in the pool plan. The coal and steel produced by the 900,000 people in this 738-square-mile industrial complex is a matter of key concern to Paris. Nominally, the Saar enjoys political autonomy. But as a result of the Franco-Saar agreement of March 3, 1950, the tiny principality is effectively joined to the French economy. It is only by counting the Saar's annual production of 3 million tons of steel as its own that France approaches parity with Germany in

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the matter of steel output. French steel production is running at an annual rate of 11 million tons while the Bonn Republic's yearly rate is 15.5 million tons. If Bonn were to achieve its aim of restoring German control to the Saar it would be difficult if not impossible for France to remain a major copartner in the Schuman accord.

Other Problems

When the Schuman plan becomes fact, there will be—at least as far as coal and steel are concerned—a customs union including the six participating nations. These countries, in order to constitute the single market envisaged by the Schuman plan, will have to dispense with all the obstructions to trade that presently impede the flow of coal and steel in the common market. That involves dropping their adherence to the most-favored nations clause. The six participants will have to negotiate with the other members of the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in order to receive permission to refuse to grant other countries the same free trade treatment that they will accord to each other.

It is not yet clear how Britain will fit into the plan of operations. Britain has remained aloof as far as membership is concerned. It mattered not one whit whether the hand at the helm was Labor or Conservative. But for all its worldly role as the head of the Commonwealth, Britain is still an "isle moored in European waters" and definitely a part of the Western European industrial community.

Paris hopes that British influence will be exerted in such fashion as is necessary to keep Germany from dominating the pool.

Many observers are anxious to see if the changes in the world economic scene since the plan was proposed will have any effect on its aims. On May 9, 1950—the day the Schuman proposal burst on a surprised world—Europe was short of steel. The mobilization that came with the Korean War intensified this shortage. It was expected that the Schuman plan would help smash this production might have been more imminent had rationalizing the various national European steel industries.

But now a surplus of steel is a distinct possibility. The possibility might have been more imminent had it not been for the protracted steel strike in this country. Despite the fact that the strike temporarily reinforced American demand for European steel, the continent may soon be turning out steel at a pace that will outstrip the effective demand. Under those circumstances, will the Schuman plan officials consciously seek to boost output and reduce the cost of steel to industrial users? Or will the High Authority of the plan—pursuing a policy of stabilizing the market—revert to the old cartel mentality of curtailing output in order to maintain the price? If the High Authority should follow in the footsteps of the old steel cartel, it has all the instruments at hand to do a first-rate job of restricting competition in the interests of the producers.

Uncertainty about the effects of

the coal-steel pool on European economy is stimulating French interest in creating a political federation in Europe. Robert Schuman, French foreign minister, told a press conference on July 1 that the governments of the nations in the pool had been asked to study a plan for setting up an international political authority, which would include the machinery for administering the coal-steel plan. He recommended the establishment not of a constituent assembly but of some kind of association for cooperation among the powers. He thought the British government would approve this form of federation.

European Federation

The French Assembly has qualms also about the advisability of ratifying in advance of federation the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. The Gaullist deputies in particular have been insisting that a European parliament must be organized before France can participate vigorously in either the pool plan or the defense community.

Sentiment for federation is growing among responsible officials in other countries, too. Many European statesmen fear that the devices put forth to spur integration—an agricultural pool and a transport union are presently under discussion—may grind to a halt in the absence of an overall political authority capable of making policy decisions at the very highest level.

(Mr. Gary, former research associate of the Foreign Policy Association, is a senior economist at the McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.)

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Egypt, Iran, and U. S. Diplomacy

The enforced abdication of King Farouk of Egypt on July 26, a few days after Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi of Iran failed in his effort to break the political influence of the nationalist Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, directs attention to weakness of American diplomatic methods in dealing with problems raised by the surge of Arab nationalism and Muslim anti-Westernism in those two Middle Eastern countries.

Faulty Diplomacy

The State Department and American ambassadors in many parts of that area have long relied on a kind of outmoded pragmatism in establishing close relationships with seemingly strong figures who are essentially pro-Western in attitude. Such figures are the former Egyptian king and the present shah of Iran. This sort of diplomacy results again and again in disappointment because the strength of these men, however agreeable their views on international affairs, frequently turns out to be an illusion. Recent Egyptian and Iranian developments suggest that the democratic United States can serve its interests in the Middle East better by appealing to a broader segment of the population than to the men of ostensible authority who inhabit palaces. The United States has done well in Turkey by encouraging democracy in political life. The foundation of American friendship there is solid because it depends on no single person. Thus American diplomacy in Turkey (and also Lebanon) offers a useful model for American diplomacy elsewhere in the Middle East.

Dependence on friendship with a few imposing individuals began to

characterize American diplomacy in the Middle East during World War II. Then the United States tried to strengthen itself in eastern North Africa by dealing with Frenchmen from the Vichy regime. Subsequently, the State Department and the Defense Department opposed the adoption of a friendly policy toward Zionism because, among other reasons, the influential King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia also opposed it. The deals with the Vichyites in French North Africa damaged the moral position of the United States before the world. The subsequent establishment of the Israeli Republic showed that the State Department need not have worried about King Ibn Saud, for he has not sought in retribution (as some feared he would) to weaken the economic position of the American oil companies in his realm.

Problems of Shah and King

Nevertheless, faith in the strong man has survived. A reflection of that faith was the State Department's encouragement to the shah of Iran to make his trip to the United States two years ago. Yet soon after his trip it became apparent that he was powerless to turn into the policy of his land his sentiments that made him attractive to America. As far as social reform was concerned, he was weaker than the great Iranian landlords and manufacturers who prosper by exploiting their compatriots. As far as international friendships were concerned, he has less to say about it than the Mullahs, the mobs in the streets, and other anti-Westerners who give force to Iranian nationalism. The weakness of the shah, exposed when nationalist Pre-

mier Mossadegh nationalized the oil fields and refineries 18 months ago, was underlined anew during the last two weeks. The shah replaced Premier Mossadegh with the pro-Western Ahmad Ghavam in order to revive friendship with Britain and America. Popular resentment quickly drove Ghavam out of office, and Mossadegh once more became premier.

Similarly, American reliance on King Farouk in Egypt became noticeable last winter. When nationalist extremists in January rioted in the Suez Canal zone against the British, the king dismissed the Wafdist (nationalist) premier and replaced him with a succession of premiers moderate in their attitude toward international affairs. It was reported at the time that Jefferson Caffery, American ambassador in Cairo, encouraged the king to act thus, and in the months since then the Truman Administration has come to feel confident that through Farouk and through the Ambassador's friendship with him, Egypt would give military support to the containment policy of the Western nations. Assuming this to be the case, when General Mohammed Naguib Bey managed a coup d'état in Egypt on July 23 and forced Farouk to abdicate three days later, the foundation of American diplomacy in Egypt disappeared.

The problem posed for the world by the explosive nationalism of the Middle East can be analyzed in terms of issues and popular attitudes. If American diplomacy continues to treat it as a problem of personalities, the United States will go on losing influence in the Muslim world.

BLAIR BOLLES



Should U.S. Change Its German Policy?

by Emil Lengyel

Professor Lengyel is Professor of Education at the School of Education, New York University. He has written many books including *Hitler*, and *The New Deal in Europe*. He is also author of the *Headline Series* pamphlets, "Eastern Europe Today," and "Israel: Problems of Nation-building."

THE weightiest arguments indicate that America's policy toward Germany should be changed. Most important of these arguments is that the arms we thrust into German hands may be used against us at some future time.

In the bargaining contest for the favors of the Reich, the Soviet Union can outbid us. The latter can command its Polish satellites to change the existing Oder-Neisse boundary for the benefit of the Reich, opening up large areas for millions of expellees now crowding Western Germany.

It is one of the basic tenets of Germans that their frustration invariably has been due to the selfish policy of the West. The country's most notable statesmen have always sponsored good relations with the Russians.

Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was the most famous of these statesmen, and he wrote in his recollections the significant words: "With France we shall never have peace, with Russia never the necessity of war, unless liberal stupidities and dynastic blunders spoil the situation."

Bismarck's first important diplomatic step as Chancellor of the Reich was to create the Three Emperors' League of the sovereigns of his own country, of Austria-Hungary and of Russia. The League was followed by the German-Russian Reinsurance Treaty, which only the "dynastic blunder" of Wilhelm II allowed to lapse.

Another great German statesman, Walther Rathenau, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the early Weimar republic, followed a similar policy. He

signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Russia at Rapallo in 1922, thereby smashing the anti-Soviet front of the West. Then, in co-operation with Britain's Lloyd George he devised the "Chequers Scheme" (so named after the British Prime Minister's country residence), to rehabilitate the Soviet Union. The ultimate aim of this scheme was to fit the Soviets into a United Europe.

Gustav Stresemann, another notable Reich statesman, also sought his country's weal in close cooperation with the Russians, and in 1926 he signed the Berlin Treaty—an extension of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922—with Moscow. In his recent book, "German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919-1939," (John Hopkins Press, 1951), Professor E. H. Carr wrote in this connection: "The reality behind the Berlin Treaty was Germany's military dependence on Soviet Russia, expressed in the secret agreements for the manufacture of munitions for Germany, and the training of German officers in prohibited weapons, on German soil."

We are told that our German "friends" will not be able to use their arms against us because we shall keep our eyes on them. The Inter-allied Military Commissions were supposed to see that the Reich limited its arms after World War I. Yet when World War II opened Germany was the best armed country in the world. Moreover, sharp eyes of vigilance never foster friendships.

By forcing arms into German hands, we defeat the peaceful elements in that country, and stimulate

the resurgence of the most extreme form of militarism. German liberals fear that the heavy burden of armament will press their country into bankruptcy, which is the fertile soil of communism. The Constitution of the Federal Reich makes no provision for rearmament. Before taking such an important step, the people should be polled in a plebiscite. The German Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) has already submitted the issue to the Federal Constitutional Court. Above all, forward-looking Germans fear that rearmament will prevent the unification of their country by creating an unbridgeable chasm between the Western and Eastern sectors.

Many Germans also ask the question whether the 12 divisions they are supposed to contribute to the European Defense Community will make much difference in the face of the estimated 225 divisions of the Soviets and their satellites. They know that the Russians have a deep-seated fear of German armed potentialities. Might not the Russians be frightened into action before Germany is fully armed? German dynamism, which precipitated two World Wars, does not seem to have spent itself. It is the consequence of German overconfidence, the weakness of German neighbors, limited space, traditions and geography. In encouraging the Germans to arm, we are feeding their dynamism.

The French, with trepidation, have now consented to a limited German rearmament in order not to antagonize the United States. Their coun-

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by James Kerr Pollock

Professor Pollock, senior adviser to the American Military Governor in Germany 1945-46, 1947, 1948, is James Orrin Murfin Professor of Political Science and chairman of the Political Science department, University of Michigan. He is author of *Germany in Power and Eclipse* (1952).

SINCE the beginning of the breakdown of four-power cooperation in Germany in the fall of 1945, the United States, Britain and France have been struggling to develop a common policy toward Germany. Without sacrificing our basic hopes of destroying militarism and establishing democracy, the three Western powers have been forced from one position to another by the determined policy of the Soviet Union to ignore the agreements it solemnly made at Yalta and Potsdam. Instead of treating Germany as an economic unit, the Soviet Union from the moment of surrender has pursued a policy of communizing Germany and of wrecking or exploiting its economic resources.

Recognizing very early the failure of four-power administration in Germany, the United States has been striving since 1945 to prevent Germany from becoming a political and economic vacuum—a situation devoutly desired by the Soviet Union. After much patient effort and considerable experimentation, first Britain and finally France, recognizing the hopelessness of further efforts to make the quadripartite machinery of the occupation work, agreed with us in 1948 to permit the Germans in the three Western zones to create the West German Federal Republic. In September, 1949, this new democratic “rump” of the former German state began its difficult task of integrating and strengthening the area under its control. Protected but occasionally hampered by the Allied High Commission this democratically selected government, headed by

its most experienced leader, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, has astonished the world with the recovery Germany has made under the government's policies.

At long last, the three Western powers have negotiated with the Germans a lawyer's paradise of conventions popularly referred to as “contractual agreements.” Accompanying these agreements and negotiated simultaneously is the so-called European Defense Community agreement, which integrates Western Germany into a European defense force.

With the signature of these agreements and the favorable action by the United States Senate on them, the German problem and our present policy toward the Bonn government enters a new era. Contemporaneous with these significant moves on the part of the Western powers, the Soviet Union, in a note of March 10 and in several subsequent moves, has endeavored in various ways to prevent the consummation of our policy of integrating Western Germany more completely into the international community.

Thus far the Soviet moves have been unsuccessful. But some doubt is now expressed in certain quarters about the soundness of our policy of using Western Germany as a necessary foundation for Western security. Consequently, it is well to summarize some of the reasons supporting our policy.

First of all it should be noted that the Bonn government, both politically and economically, has achieved more than anyone thought possible. Study of the reports of the High

Commissioners makes this point very clear. (Since July 19 the U.S. High Commissioner has been Walter Donnelly, former ambassador to Austria.)

Second, the Bonn government is the lineal descendent of the government and of many of the policies originally established in the American zone. It is now a substantial instrumentality. To scuttle it in favor of some new but ill-defined all-German government following elections, would be most unwise.

Next, the Bonn government, in spite of great diversions and difficulties, has developed a determined policy of integration with the Western powers. Although the contractual agreements were modified as many times to suit the French as the Germans, the German Bundestag, overlooking the French démarche in the Saar, on July 10 voted favorably to send the two pacts to committees, and unless all signs fail, will ratify them in the early fall. The Germans are not dragging their feet in this basically important matter.

Finally, German military strength is necessary if we are to erect a satisfactory defense against possible Soviet aggression. Using the French formula of a European defense community, the Western powers and the responsible government of Western Germany have worked out as satisfactory a solution of German rearmament in support of world peace as is possible.

We have, therefore, a well established West German government ready to assume its share of the defense of Western Europe and all comment about unifying Germany should take this significant fact into consideration. To be so interested in unification and in negotiating with the Soviets that sight is lost of our achievements and accomplishments

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try is not warlike, nor are Italy and the Benelux nations. They know the strongest military force is bound to occupy the place of the leader in the European Defense Community, and that potentially is Germany.

What then is the solution to the problem raised by the policy of arming Germany? While we may not agree with the proposal of the German Social Democrats, it is worthwhile to note the argument they have often stated most recently in an article in the July 1952 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, by Carlo Schmid, deputy

chairman of the party and vice president of the federal parliament: "The German problem can be settled only as part of a general new order, and the basis for this has still to be found. The dispute between the United States and Soviet Russia determines today the fate of the world . . . but no genuine and general political order can emerge except as a result of a basic accord of the two remaining World Powers."

When the future generation looks over our age, it will be able to point out that the decision we have taken on this issue was the turning point of our historical age.

Pollock

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in Western Germany, is to follow a dream. Only on the basis of liberty and democracy as established in the Bonn Republic can we safely consider any enlargement of Germany. As Dr. Adenauer has stated: "When Soviet Russia realizes that it can no longer prevent the integration of Europe, and when the [program of] Western armament is strong enough to impress Soviet Russia, then the time will have come for a peaceful agreement with Soviet Russia. And then, I am certain, the unification of Germany in freedom will also follow."

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Shifting Gears in Britain

London—In this cool and brilliantly sunny midsummer of 1952, when most Britishers are busy with thoughts of cricket, horse racing and the Bank holidays, two principal questions preoccupy responsible members of the Conservative government and of the Labor Opposition. These questions are, first, how to bring Britain safely out of the succession of economic crises it has experienced since World War II; and, second, how to find a foreign policy formula which would reconcile Britain's multifarious roles as a member of the Atlantic Community, an ally of the United States, a member of a multiracial Commonwealth, and the still vigorous residuary legatee of a once world-marching empire.

The economic problem, which is now acknowledged to be due essentially to fundamental weaknesses resulting from the stresses and strains of war rather than to the nefarious machinations of any one political party, was brought once more into

the spotlight by Prime Minister Winston Churchill's decision of June 16 to hold a two-day economic debate before Parliament recessed on August 1. That same week a report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, prepared by a group of eminent classical economists and made public in Paris on July 19, described the deterioration in Britain's balance of payments as "alarming" and "spectacular," sharply criticized the Labor party's postwar financial policies and welcomed the tighter controls on credit introduced by the Conservatives.

Arms or Exports?

In actuality, both Conservatives and Laborites have faced the same issue—the issue of striking a workable balance between three basic factors: living standards, exports and armament production. Britain's economy has staged a remarkable recovery since the dark days of 1945, but it remains dangerously precari-

ous particularly because of its great dependence on world trade, which makes it acutely sensitive to the lightest fluctuations in the prices of imported raw materials and in the import requirements of its principal customers.

Critics among the Conservatives have blamed the Laborites for seeking to improve the living standards of the masses beyond what Britain could afford. Yet the question is often asked, even among Conservatives, whether any decline in current living standards, already regarded as inadequate for current needs, would not jeopardize the productivity of the workers, and result in social unrest which would hamper production both of arms and export goods. So delicate is the existing balance that neither party has much room for maneuvering unless the international trade and financial situation should miraculously improve.

Britain's crucial problem is now to expand its exports and, at the same

time, maintain the rate of rearmament which former Prime Minister Clement Attlee, no less than Mr. Churchill, supports, and which Labor's stormy petrel, Aneurin Bevan, has long denounced as impracticable.

Opinion in Britain differs as to how the reconciliation between exports and arms could be achieved. Some demand higher productivity from the trade unions which for their part, after firmly holding the line on wages in the postwar period, are now looking toward wage increases. Others, including some Conservatives, believe that the workers are putting forth an adequate effort but that production is held up by shortages and excessively high prices of strategic raw materials, for which they blame stock piling by the United States since the outbreak of the Korean war. Still others contend that British manufacturers of machinery, heavy electrical plant and other capital goods which are doing well in both dollar and sterling markets, cannot effectively compete with the revived export production of Germany and Japan as long as they must also fulfill defense orders that force them to offer very long delivery dates to overseas buyers.

Proposed Remedies

Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of these various arguments, one thing is clear: British economy must now shift gears, and shift promptly. As of July, exports showed a fall of 13 percent in 1952 as compared with the same period of 1951, largely due to the decline of British exports of consumer goods to the Commonwealth countries, notably Australia. Much as the British would welcome the prospect of a permanently larger market for their goods in the United States, they are too realistic to expect such a development in the immediate future.

What, then, are the possible remedies? It is now generally admitted the Lisbon rearmament commitments may have to be whittled down so that a higher priority can be given to production for export. It is also hoped that the United States will expand offshore purchases of British armaments for supply to NATO forces, chiefly tanks and jet fighters, thereby increasing Britain's dollar resources without the need of enlarging the American market for British manufactured goods. On the domestic front, the government has urged the trade unions to refrain from wage increase demands (on July 18 the Ministry of Labor referred back to the wages councils the wage demands of 1,500,000 in the shop, distributive and allied trades); and, after having previously criticized Labor's slowness in providing new housing, is now considering some curtailment of its own housing program.

The Labor party, meanwhile, is striving to re-think its economic policies. Many Laborites, after carrying out their principal objectives while in office, now feel disillusioned to find that nationalization—particularly of such undertakings as coal mining which were in a parlous condition—does not of itself offer a universal panacea. Some Laborites believe that their government made the mistake of using nationalization as a weapon in the struggle between economic groups instead of an instrument in the overall planning of the nation's economy, and are turning their attention to future economic plans. While Aneurin Bevan remains a thorn in the flesh of leading Laborites, the Conservatives' admission that he may have been right "by accident," as Mr. Churchill put it, about the rearmament burden, has strengthened his acknowledged capacity to capitalize and express mis-

givings which are not confined to his group, or even to the Labor party, but are also felt among Conservatives.

Under existing circumstances there is a marked tendency, even on the part of strong advocates of international cooperation, to discuss the possibility of achieving greater economic self-sufficiency, through intensified agriculture; the establishment of new industries to produce consumer goods now imported; and more vigorous development of the raw materials and foods produced by relatively underdeveloped areas within the sterling orbit. It is recognized that such attempts at self-sufficiency might boomerang by causing further cuts in imports of British goods by other countries. The advantages, however, many believe, would outweigh the disadvantages.

Among these advantages, as seen here, would be not only the prospect of enlarged domestic resources, but also the psychological lift that would occur if the British could feel less dependent than they are today on the financial aid of the United States.

Others believe, however, it is fantastic to expect that Britain, with a population at least 10 million in excess of what its resources can support, will be able to live on home-produced food. The holders of this opinion look to more intensive development of resources in the colonies and closer economic ties within the Commonwealth. Thus all economic discussions come back sooner or later to foreign policy.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the first of several articles on current trends in Western Europe.)

Charles Evans Hughes, by Merlo J. Pusey. New York, Macmillan, 1951. Two volumes. \$15.

This broad-gauged, illuminating biography of a great citizen distinguished for public service in many fields should be of particular interest to all Americans concerned with the evolution of United States foreign policy.



FPA Bookshelf

THE UNITED NATIONS

Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1950, edited by Clyde Eagleton and Richard N. Swift, New York, New York University Press, 1951. \$4.50.

An interesting feature of this comprehensive survey of UN activities during 1950 is the inclusion of résumés of actual discussions on the issues handled by the various UN organs. Dr. Eagleton heads NYU's Graduate Program of Studies in UN and World Affairs.

The United Nations: Blueprint for Peace, by Stephen S. Fenichell and Phillip Andrews, Philadelphia, Winston, 1951. \$2.

Emphasizing some of the UN's concrete achievements in the field of human welfare through UNESCO, the World Health and the Food and Agriculture organizations, this attractive book is illustrated with over 100 striking photographs. Benjamin Cohen, assistant secretary-general, has written the foreword.

Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1950, prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. New York, United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1951. \$3.75. (Sales No. 1951.II.F.4)

These annual UN studies have encouraged a more regular flow of statistics, both published and unpublished, from governments and international organizations, which make these series indispensable to serious students of European and Asian problems. Following a general survey of the basic factors of development, statistics and analyses of the current year's progress are presented.

Yearbook on Human Rights for 1949. Lake Success, United Nations, 1951. \$5. (Sales No. 1951.XIV.1)

The fourth volume of an annual series, this book contains the texts of new na-

tional laws—including electoral laws—enacted in 1949 affecting human rights, arranged by country, as well as texts of international treaties and agreements. In the present volume there is a new section dealing with basic laws on human rights in trust and non-self-governing territories.

The International Court of Justice, by Oliver J. Lissitzyn. United Nations Studies: No. 6. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. \$1.75.

A discussion of the "work of the Court and its place in organized international society" as well as an explanation of how the Court works, its importance to the effective development of international law, and its contribution to the enforcement of world peace.

The United Nations and Power Politics, by John MacLaurin. New York, Harper, 1951. \$5.

A decidedly unorthodox, exhaustive study of the ways in which the United Nations works and could be made to work far more effectively, by an educator and statesman of wide experience who prefers to write under a pseudonym. The unorthodox aspect of his views is that he does not find the U.S.S.R. alone guilty of hampering the development of the United Nations, and urges greater boldness on the part of the non-Communist countries in living up to the spirit of the UN Charter.

BOOKS ON GERMANY

Germany and the Future of Europe, edited by Hans J. Morgenthau. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951. \$3.50.

A number of experts clarify and develop alternative solutions to the three-fold problem which Germany presents to the West: to prevent a resurgence of German imperialism, to restore Germany to political and economic health, and to deny German resources and allegiance to the Soviet

Union. Editor Morgenthau quotes Winston Churchill to support his thesis that only through talks with Russia on the highest level can a solution be found for the German political problem.

All Honorable Men, by James Stewart Martin, Boston, Little, Brown, 1950. \$3.50.

The former chief of the Decartelization Branch, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), gives an authoritative account of the decline in Washington's World War II determination to destroy the Nazi war machine and the German monopoly-cartel system which had made that war machine possible. This story of the manipulations of the cartellists who, before, during and after the war, conducted "business as usual," not only in Germany and Europe but also in the United States is well documented.

The Saar: Battleground and Pawn, by Frank M. Russell. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1951. \$5.

A valuable summary and diagnosis of the problems of a highly controversial area which is once again a subject of conflict between France and Germany.

BOOKS ON U.S. POLICY

The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951, by Harold M. Vinacke. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952. (Issued under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.) \$3.

The author, professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati and a leading authority on the Far East, provides a timely and objective analysis of the problems the United States faced in a strategic area during years of turbulent postwar readjustment. It is a cool appraisal particularly valuable in this period of heated controversy.

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

**Denmark, Norway and Sweden:
Economic and Political Trends**

by Lithgow Osborne, president
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